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**A MODEL FOR THE SEAMLESS ARMY OF THE
21ST CENTURY**

BY

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
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A MODEL FOR THE SEAMLESS ARMY OF THE 21ST CENTURY

by

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Abstract

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The Secretary of the Army has established the vision of a *Seamless Army*. This thesis will focus on erasing the traditional lines which have evolved among the three components of the U.S. Army (Active, Guard and Reserve) and suggest a framework based on ways and means to overcome existing barriers. Non-traditional brigades and divisions which combine active and reserve component units may give the Army the ways and means to satisfy the National Military Strategy with decreasing resources.

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The Secretary of the Army has announced his vision of a *Seamless Army*. A truly seamless Army would erase the traditional lines which have evolved among the three components of the U.S. Army (Active, Guard and Reserve) to form one total force. The U.S. Army strives for: "*a total force, trained and ready to fight; a strategic force, capable of decisive victory.*"¹ In reality, the Army has three competing components, each with separate agendas and political associations.

What is a *Seamless Army*? It is an evolving concept developed over the years to organize, train and equip the three components of the U.S. Army. *The Seamless Army* is often used to represent a modern version of the Total Force policy published in 1973 by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. The *Seamless Army* referred to in this paper is the author's proposed model for the Army of the 21st Century. This paper will suggest a way to model the divisions in a Seamless Army based on the successful experiences of the 194th Separate Armored Brigade (SAB), Fort Knox, KY.

THE CURRENT FORCE

Our current force consists of active and reserve component units struggling to overcome related problems

concerning budget, readiness, and future missions. Over the years, America's Army has been forced to change with the tides of time and has evolved into the finest fighting force in the world. The Army is currently downsizing and reorganizing while operational missions continue to increase. Faced with a declining budget, the U.S. Army clearly needs new methodologies and initiatives to create or restructure the post cold war force to prepare for the future. To examine any initiative, we need to look at unique problems faced by each component.

The Active Force

The active force of the U.S. Army has been reduced to a level that has abrogated their capability to execute two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Some argue that the most effective organization for the United States Army would be a large, highly trained, and fully equipped active force with minimum augmentation from reserve components. The Army of the 21st Century will face the challenge of developing a force structure with the most effective and efficient force that can be manned, equipped, and trained with diminishing resources. The operational missions of our active forces have increased to the point that some leaders

fear that we have "redlined" the institutional Army. Some active duty soldiers are deployed more than 180 days each year. On the other hand, the reserve forces of the Army would welcome the opportunity to execute operational missions. It is time to analyze the U.S. Army structure and suggest a new way to organize, train and equip the force with a goal of forming a SEAMLESS ARMY for the 21st Century.

The recent reorganization of the U.S. Army active divisions has created a geographical command and control problem similar to that experienced by ARNG divisions for many years. Seven out of ten division commanders now have brigades in remote locations away from the division base.² FORSCOM and EUCOM have entirely different training and resourcing regulations and policies. Budgeting, resourcing, and training is more difficult because of the geographic separation and conflicting administrative procedures.

Adding to the burden caused by reorganization and increased missions, active divisions have difficulty resourcing training requirements generated by the Army National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERB). Active divisions must often tap into unit training funds to support the increasing training and operational requirements of ARNG and USAR units. Training funds for ARNG units flow through the

peacetime (Title 32) headquarters and are not readily available to assist in combined training exercises with reserve components.

The Reserve Force

What role should the Reserve Components of the Army have in the 21st Century Army? The mix of active and reserve component units is logically based on a National Military Strategy by which the Army must maintain the capability to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The reserve components of the Army consist of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). The ARNG has dual Federal and State missions. State Adjutants General (TAG) command ARNG units in the 54 states and territories. Adjutants General command both the Army and Air National Guard and report to the State Governor as the Commander-in-Chief. Each State Area Commander reports to both the Adjutant General and the Director, Army National Guard (see Fig. 1). The Chief, National Guard Bureau is responsible for the administration, budget, operations, training, and organization of both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG). The ARNG has combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units.³

Reserve Components




Fig.1. Structure of the Reserve Components of the Army

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) provides a Ready Reserve force and a Retired Reserve for the Army. The Ready Reserve includes MTOE and TDA units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and Individual Ready Reserves (IRR). The USAR also provides Training Divisions (Exercise and Institutional Training) in support of active and reserve forces. The USAR is commanded by ten numbered Regional Support Commands (formally Army Reserve Command or ARCOM)⁴ reporting directly to US Army Reserve Command (USARC). The Chief Army Reserve serves as the Deputy Commanding General, FORSCOM and Commander, USARC. The statutory authority for

the USAR is Title 10, U.S.C.

The Reserve Component structure presents complex command, control and communication complications for the Army (see Fig. 1). Military leaders operate more effectively with units under their direct supervisory chain-of-command. The reserve component structure involves a peacetime chain-of-command and is not readily accessible to a wartime CINC without presidential mobilization authority. Exacerbating the problem of access, the Secretary of Defense does not currently have the authority to activate selected Reserve Component units for operational missions.

Faced with declining resources, all components struggle to recruit, train, organize, equip and maintain its force. The ARNG and USAR have developed tiered readiness standards to stay within reduced resource limits. Active component commanders may be reluctant to bear the responsibility of training and resourcing reserve units that fall outside their direct chain-of-command.

Both active and reserve units attempt to maintain minimum readiness standards to ensure their survivability in the future force structure. John P. White, chair of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, reported that the ". . . *National Guard [Divisions]* are

*maintained at readiness levels that [has] prevented planning on their timely use."*⁵ Members of the U.S. Congress and others pose questions concerning the future of the U.S. Army. Michael B. Donley summarized those questions:

*The Reserve components . . . What should be their role in a post-Cold War strategy, within both the DOD management structure and the Federal-state relationship with regard to the Guard? Is current Total Force policy sufficient to define this role? Is there a way to depoliticize the Reserve components and to develop a modern management approach that could more efficiently meet Federal requirements for mobilization and state needs for augmented public safety and disaster relief? If we were starting with a clean slate in the late 20th century, would we establish Federal Reserves as well as multiple National Guards.*⁶

National values and interests play a key role in the development of force structure of the U.S. Army. As Mr. Donley suggested, those who have the loudest political voice may not be speaking in the interests of most Americans or the uniformed services. Some military associations (e.g., AUSA, NGAUS, ROA) have more than two-thirds of their membership as corporate sponsors. Corporate members of military associations routinely draft resolutions that appear before Congress to encourage the procurement of their products. An analysis of the reports generated by some associations suggests three competing components of the U.S. Army.


Fifty-three per cent of all combat support units are in

the reserve components of the U.S. Army. While 53% of our combat power is in the Army National Guard, the only wartime mission assigned to ARNG combat divisions and brigades is one of strategic reserve. Force XXI General Headquarters Exercises have validated a need for *"Improved access to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, and enhanced readiness of Reserve Component units."*⁷ Our national military strategy identifies the need for reserve forces as a critical component of the strategic concept after a conflict or engagement begins. Employments would ". . . generate the required forces by withdrawing from lower priority missions and mobilizing critical Reserve forces. . . ."⁸

The ARNG has eight combat divisions and fifteen Enhanced Brigades. ARNG Enhanced Brigades must maintain a readiness level to deploy within 90 days following mobilization. By law, Enhanced Brigades must also *"have automated systems and equipment compatibility with Active Component divisions."*⁹ All Enhanced Brigades have a directed Training Association with an active division or corps (no wartime affiliation). ARNG Divisions have no training or administrative responsibility for Enhanced Brigades. The ARNG Enhanced Brigades replaced the ARNG Roundout brigades

(combat) without any wartime alignment with active divisions or corps.

Since the deactivation of the 194th Separate Armored Brigade, Fort Knox, KY, we have severed most direct wartime alignments with reserve component combat and combat support units.¹⁰ History will reflect the separation of active and reserve combat units as a very serious error. The 194th SAB was very active in the Army Affiliation Program since the middle seventies. This training affiliation enhanced the



readiness of both active and reserve units. In 1992, the 194th was reorganized into a composite brigade (see Fig. 2). An active component commander commanded the brigade with

assigned reserve component units. This successful structure was organized with two active armor battalions (Ft Knox), one ARNG armor battalion (Kentucky), one ARNG mechanized infantry battalion (Minnesota), and one field artillery battalion (West Virginia).¹¹ The field artillery battalion deployed to Desert Storm and was attached to the 18th Field Artillery Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corp. The success of this battalion was directly attributed to the long standing training affiliation with the 194th SAB. Following the model of the 194th SAB, future divisions and brigades could combine active and reserve component units to provide the Army a flexible means to accomplish its mission with decreasing resources.

In contrast to their active counterparts, ARNG and USAR commanders must recruit and train individuals down to company and detachment level. Meaningful training cannot be conducted until a unit has the minimum level of MOS qualified unit personnel. Some unit personnel are not available for priority unit training because of required schools (MOS qualification, Noncommissioned Officer Education System and Officer Education System). High priority units (to include the Enhanced Brigades) are authorized additional structure to ensure personnel readiness (available strength). Lower priority units (to include the divisions) are only authorized

83 per cent of wartime required strength. ARNG division commanders do not have the flexibility to draw upon one brigade to increase the readiness of another. Compounding this problem, Congressional funding is based on the ability of reserve component units to maintain their authorized end-strength. This difference (between required and authorized end-strength versus actual end strength) is called a 'death spiral' as funding continues to be cut as a direct result of actual end-strength declines.

The United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) is responsible for the management of Army Training Requirements and Resourcing System (ATRRS) for the total Army. USAR training divisions are invaluable assets authorized by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (USATRADOC) to train soldiers from all components. The Total Army Schools System (TASS) assists reserve and active units in meeting formal school requirements. Reserve component units could not complete the required MOS training without USAR training divisions.

Reserve units struggle with the immense problem of finding the time to train for their wartime mission while maintaining the capability to mobilize and deploy with minimum post mobilization training. Reserve operational

missions (active duty tours) improve unit readiness by allowing time for mission training.¹²

The Army of the 21st Century must be capable of fighting and winning our nation's wars. The effective and efficient force must be relevant to the national military strategy and focus on mission readiness. Our national military strategy defines the strategic concepts for the Armed Forces as overseas presence and power projection.¹³ This force must also be accessible for war fighting, domestic actions, and any other mission assigned by the national command authorities. President Clinton established a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.¹⁴ Some questions arose as to the wisdom of committing reserve component units to meet that strategy. Do Guard and Reserve soldiers have the necessary support from their employers and families to participate in long term operations? Are they trained? Are they ready?

As a test of their capabilities, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units (to include individual volunteers) are currently conducting several peacetime operations to include Haiti and Bosnia. A noteworthy operation is the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO-SINAI). This United Nations peacekeeping mission

was a one year integration with the 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), or the *Desert Panthers*. Seventy-two percent of this battalion were Army National Guard soldiers, 8 percent USAR, and 20 percent active component. The specific mission of this battalion was to "conduct relief in place and observe, report and verify compliance with the Egyptian-Israeli Protocol of 1981".¹⁵ After-Action reports from this mission have been extremely favorable. Reserve and National Guard soldiers received invaluable training. Active soldiers who did not deploy were allowed to train for their primary wartime mission--a mutually beneficial arrangement. The additional cost of such a force (reserve pay and allowances) is under study to decide the relative value of increased readiness versus cost.

The Need for Change

Although Secretary of Defense William J. Perry directed ". . . greater use of reserve component forces to relieve active duty units that have excessive commitments."¹⁶, the combat role of the Army National Guard is ignored. A draft concept published by The Joint Warfighting Center states:

Large standing reserve units are ill suited both by

*mission and mobilization policy to be fully effective in this future force. Their role, despite their acknowledged service in the past, must change.*¹⁷

Are Reserve Component units "ill suited" for the future? Several studies suggest that ARNG combat units are fully capable for combat. A report published by the Armed Forces Journal states:

*An Army Research Institute study of unit performance at the National Training Center (NTC) found, surprisingly, that active Army combat battalions achieved only 20 percent better proficiency than Army Guard battalions by the end of NTC cycle. Moreover, Guard battalions achieved the active Army units' minimum combat proficiency (a score of 1.48) in less than 21 days.*¹⁸

Future Dynamics - 2010

Should we change reserve component missions and policies? If we could predict the domestic and world environment of the 21st Century, the answer would be clear. While we cannot predict the future, some dynamics that will shape that environment have endured over time. The following dynamics will likely forge the environment for the Army of the 21st Century:¹⁹

- ▶ The Army's share of the Federal budget will likely be less.
- ▶ The American people will likely focus on domestic threats when our national security is not at risk.

- ▶ Congress will not fund sufficient active forces to sustain two simultaneous regional conflicts.
- ▶ The Reserve Components of the Army (USAR and ARNG) will constitute a large portion of the total force.
- ▶ Active component missions will continue to increase because of limited regional conflicts and operations other than war.
- ▶ Resourcing for Reserve Component units will continue to decrease because of the increased missions.

The Army simply cannot expect to meet the challenges of the 21st Century without a trained and ready reserve component. ARNG combat units cannot continue to be treated as auxiliary forces. The Army of the 21st Century must be an interdependent force. Congress has already modified the Total Force with Title XI of the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act.²⁰ This Act created the Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades and mandated active-reserve training associations without wartime alignments. As a result, the Army National Guard Roundout brigades (aligned with active divisions) no longer exist. As a Total Force, we are the eighth largest Army in the world. Since future theater-level operations will likely include a large reserve component force, we should seriously begin work on the design of a

Seamless Army.

THE SEAMLESS FORCE

The elimination of two or more active divisions will result in a drastic reduction in our capability to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. To prevent additional reductions, Army divisions (AC and ARNG) could be structured to form a basis for force expansion and improved mission capability (compared to the loss of additional active assets). If we had a truly Seamless Army, the force would be interdependent and function across all traditional boundaries.

The most likely engagements of the 21st Century include Limited Regional Conflicts (LRC) and operations other than war. Although the active OPTEMPO has greatly increased, the only wartime mission currently assigned to ARNG combat units is one of strategic reserve or Follow-on Reinforcement Forces (FRF).²¹ Some ARNG divisions could be dedicated to other operations to include peacekeeping, military-to-military assistance, and nation building. ARNG divisions could provide relief to the peacekeeping force in Bosnia as unit or individual replacements. Most of the ARNG troops who served in the MFO-SINAI peacekeeping operation (see above)

were from the 29th Infantry Division in Maryland and Virginia. They transferred USAR and ARNG fillers to this battalion on a volunteer basis. Army Secretary Togo West suggested that the success of this mission provides an interesting prospect and possibly "a new way of doing things


. . . "22

The Seamless Division

Rather than retire the colors of the 24th Infantry Division and the 2d Armor Division, the U.S. Army should form Seamless combat divisions of active and reserve units. The relative cost of ARNG combat divisions is estimated to be 25 percent of the cost of active Army divisions.²³ If we shift combat resources to the ARNG, the result would be a much more effective and efficient force.

Under this concept, a total of four ARNG divisions would reorganize (and downsize) to resource two active division. CONUS-based USAR MTOE or Troop Program Units (TPU) would be transferred to the ARNG. Excess forces would be removed from the RC force structure to meet the budget goals established by Congress (bill payers). This concept would permit ARNG division commanders to reduce one brigade to

cadre strength to gain the resourcing to maintain two combat ready brigades (rather than having three brigades at 83% MTOE personnel fill, organize two brigades at 100%). Active division commanders would have the flexibility to organize a combined-arms task force from AC and RC assets for specific



operational missions. Seamless divisions would have three full combat brigades -- One active brigade (with ARNG personnel in key positions) and two composite AC/ARNG brigades (with AC personnel in a full time support role). Two additional ARNG divisions would be restructured with dual-mission combat support and combat service support units to support both Federal and State missions. The ARNG CS/CSS divisions would provide the support slice (CS and CSS units)

to roundout the two seamless divisions.

The structure of the remaining two ARNG divisions would be identical to the active divisions. Those divisions would be assigned a battalion or brigade task force specifically trained for operations other than war (e.g., MFO-SINAI operation). Increased operational missions would give ARNG divisions priority training opportunities for key personnel while remaining as the strategic reserve force. This mission assignment would also relieve active divisions committed to other operations.

The most difficult process in forming Seamless Divisions is determining wartime and peacetime relationships as depicted in the table below. This prototype structure assumes that the U.S. Army would revive the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky and the 2d Armored Division at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The selection process for the actual division locations would involve much more than the geographic considerations used in this prototype. Each ARNG Enhanced Brigade would be aligned with a division to form a wartime or training association.

Table -- Prototype Seamless Division Structure

Divisions	E	Enhanced Brigade/Affiliation		REMARKS/MISSION
1st Cavalry Division Ft Hood, TX	E	155th Armor Bde Mississippi		Wartime Relationship
101st Air Assault Division Ft Campbell, KY	E	76th Infantry Bde Indiana		"
82nd Airborne Division Ft Bragg, NC	E	53d Infantry Bde Florida		"
10th Mountain Division Ft Drum, NY	E	27th Infantry Bde New York		"
3d Infantry Division*1 Ft Stewart, GA	E	48th Infantry Bde (M) Georgia		"
1st Infantry Division Germany; 1 Bde, Ft Riley, KS	E	218th Infantry Bde (M) South Carolina		" Assistance from 29th ID.
4th Infantry Division (M)*2 Ft Hood, TX	E	256th Infantry Bde (M) Louisiana		"
1st Armored Division*3 Germany; 1 Bde, Ft Riley, KS	E	116th Armor Bde Idaho/Oregon/Montana /Wyoming		"
2nd Infantry Division South Korea; 1 Bde, Ft Lewis, Wash	E	81st Infantry Bde Washington		"
25th Infantry Division Hawaii	E	29th Infantry Bde Hawaii		"
#24th INFANTRY DIVISION FT KNOX, KY	E #	30th Infantry Bde (M)*4 North Carolina	#	Seamless Division w/28ID, 35ID & 194SAB
#2d ARMORED DIVISION FT POLK, LA	#	2 Brigades 49th Armored Div	#	Seamless Division w/49AD & 2d ACR(AC)
28th Infantry Division Pennsylvania	#	24th Infantry Division Ft Knox, KY	#	1 Armor Bn to 24ID Dual Mission FA
29th Infantry Division Virginia	A	1st Infantry Division (Training Association)	A	Assist w/218 Inf Bde South Carolina
34th Infantry Division Minnesota	E	45th Infantry Brigade*5 Oklahoma		Dual Mission FA/MLRS
35th Infantry Division (M) Kansas	#	24th Infantry Division Ft Knox, KY	#	1 Inf Bn to 24ID (KYARNG)
38th Infantry Division Indiana	E	39th Infantry Brigade*6 Arkansas		OOTW Wartime Mission

Divisions	E	Enhanced Brigade/Affiliation		REMARKS/MISSION
40th Infantry Division (M) California	E	41st Infantry Brigade*7 Oregon		OOTW Wartime Mission
42d Infantry Division New York		10th Mountain Division (Training Association)		Assist with 27th Inf Bde
49th Armored Division Texas	#	2d Armored Division Ft Polk, LA	#	2 Seamless Brigades
<p>Note 1: 3d Inf Div replaced 24th Inf Div at Ft Stewart, GA. Note 2: 4th Inf Div moved from Ft Carson, CO to Ft Hood, TX replacing the inactivated 2d Armd Div. Note 3: 1st Armd Div replaced 4th Inf Div with one brigade at Ft Riley, KS. Note 4: The 30th Bde currently has a Training Association with XVIII Airborne Corps. Note 5: The 45th Bde currently has a Training Association with III Corps. Note 6: The 39th Bde currently has a Training Association with V Corps. Note 7: The 41st Bde currently has a Training Association with I Corps. E = Enhanced Brigade. # = Seamless Division.</p> <p>(Compiled by author from various sources)</p>				

The Army National Guard leadership recently approved a plan to convert half their combat brigades into combat support and combat service support units.²⁴ The prototype suggested above could be used to redesign the current force to meet the shortfall in combat support and combat service units. USAR Training Divisions would continue to provide critical individual and unit training support to the *Seamless Army*. The flow of key leaders among the three components would be required to establish a more professional training base (USAR Schools, ROTC and Training Divisions). Individuals from the USAR (IRR, IMA and TDA units) could fill any key personnel vacancies.

In the event of a major regional conflict, ARNG Enhanced Brigades would roundout a designated active or ARNG

division. Currently, Enhanced Brigades are not considered a factor until 90 days following mobilization; however, evidence exists that many battalions can be ready to deploy by the time sea lift is available.²⁵ If sea lift is available, all high-priority combat and combat support reserve units could arrive in a theater with any Corps package.

Leader Readiness

The leadership of the Seamless Army is perhaps the most critical element of our future force. Current law prevents assigning non mobilized units from one component to another; however, no such restrictions exist for assigning unit personnel on temporary tours between components. The seamless force would establish wartime command affiliations between active divisions and brigades and their reserve component counterparts. ARNG combat brigades and battalions would be staffed with a number of active duty officers and Non commissioned officers to supplement the full time support force in MTOE positions. Serving as advisors and trainers, 5,000 Active Component soldiers have already been assigned to assist ARNG Enhanced Brigade training under the Forces Command's Ground Force Readiness Enhancement [GFRE] structure.²⁶

Some writers express the opinion that Reserve component

leaders are not prepared for ground combat because they only train 39 days each training year. Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr. stated one opinion: "*The incomplete preparation of combat arms officers and NCOs in Reserve component combat units presents the greatest obstacle to combat readiness.*"²⁷ In contrast, few are aware that many ARNG leaders spend 60 to 90 days each year in special training activities such as Active Duty Special Workdays (ADSW), Active Duty Training (ADT [schools]), and Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP) training with active units. Some active component leaders train less than 200 days each year (if we subtract weekends, leave, holidays, and Red/Amber training cycles).

Reserve leader training with active units has been a tremendous readiness enhancer. The Seamless Army would improve the quality of its leadership by rotating ARNG and USAR leaders on temporary tours of active duty (TTAD) for MTOE duty positions with active units. Over time, the result would be one cohesive combat organization.²⁸

Resource Management

The Seamless Army must be organized to manage their resources. Competition for dollars will not likely allow duplication of effort or forces that are not relevant to our National security. Defense spending will be reduced 41 per

cent from FY-85 to FY-97.²⁹ The Congressional flow and administration of funds will not likely change between Title 10, United States Code (Army) and Title 32 (National Guard). Resource management in Seamless Divisions would require joint management of all resources. A joint Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) would manage the two statutory budgets. Similar committees would coordinate combined maintenance and logistics support facilities. The dollars saved by combining logistics and maintenance functions could be used to support mission training. Each command (AC and RC) would retain the statutory mission and responsibility to recruit, train and maintain its component while jointly managing resources.

Downsizing the Army has been historically used during peacetime to meet budget demands. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, based at Fort Polk, is currently under review for possible elimination from the active force structure as a bill payer.³⁰ The Seamless Army approach suggested in this paper provides a model to redesign the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and other forces during peacetime to provide the flexibility to expand the necessary combat power for future conflicts.

CONCLUSIONS

Carl von Clausewitz stated that the ability of any nation to wage war may be explained by a phenomenon which

would "always make war a paradoxical trinity . . . "

Clausewitz defines this trinity as ". . . the people; . . . the commander and his army; [and] the government." He also stated that "*The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; . . .*" He explained his trinity concept by suggesting that any theory that ignores the interrelationship among the three "magnets" (The People, The Army and The Government) would be "totally useless."³¹

A Seamless Army would allow much more day-to-day contact with the American people. The concerns of an Army composed of citizen-soldiers will reflect the concerns of the people. The Viet Nam War serves as an example of a war conducted by our government without the passion of the people. The American people did not permit the National Command Authorities to commit large reserve component units (as viewed by the President). In contrast, during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, communities all over America lined the streets to encourage (and pray for) *their* National Guard and USAR units as convoys moved to an uncertain destiny. Those same people cheered and shed tears of joy as their friends and neighbors returned victorious. This rebirth of American patriotism was possible partially due to the involvement of an Army that belonged to the people. Just as Viet Nam ripped the very fabric of our Nation, Desert

Storm reunited the people, the government and the military.

The Army National Guard and US Army Reserve have always been full partners in the defense of this nation. The Seamless Army must be an interdependent fighting force of active and reserve forces. We must stabilize units to prepare for the 21st Century and give them a wartime mission that adds value to their service. The successful organization and performance of the 194th Separate Armored Brigade should serve as a model for the Army Force XXI. The 194th SAB proved that integrated units and leaders (AC and RC) could function effectively and efficiently. If we can successfully integrate the U.S. Army, the 21st Century force will have a strong identity, purpose and become a more effective total force -- **A Seamless Army.**

NOTES

¹Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary of the Army, America's Army of the 21st Century, Force XXI: Meeting the 21st Century Challenge, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, Ft Monroe, VA 23651, 15 January 1995, 1.

²Colonel John A. Bonin, "Brigades: Building Blocks for Force XXI," USAWC Strategic Research Project, 18 April 1995, 36.

³Department of the Army, Organization of the United States Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1. (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army), 14 June 1994, 50.

⁴Ibid, 49. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Westcott provided current concept plan notes for the reorganization and reduction of the USAR which differs from DA Pam 10-1. The reorganization plan includes eight Functional Commands, ten Regional Support Commands, five Divisions (Exercise) and seven Divisions (Institutional Training).

⁵John P. White, Chairman, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, "Readiness at a Reasonable Cost," DEFENSE 95, Issue 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, 17.

⁶Michael B. Donley, "Problems of Defense Organization and Management," Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 95, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 93-94.

⁷Sullivan and West, 21.

⁸John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, USGPO, (Washington), ii.

⁹Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, America's Army, Enhanced Brigades, Army Initiatives Group, Room 3D548, Pentagon, DCSOPS, 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310, (undated), unnumbered page 8.

¹⁰I served a total of thirteen years with the 1-201 FA, West Virginia Army National Guard. This battalion was affiliated with the 194th SAB, Ft Knox, KY during the entire period. Before the 194th SAB was deactivated in July 1995, the 1-201 FA was the Direct Support FA battalion. The superior state of readiness of the 1-201 FA is directly attributable to this affiliation and wartime alignment.

¹¹Bonin, 116.

¹²Deborah Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, "Desert Panthers Poised to Strike: The Total Army at its Best," National Guard, Volume XLIX, Number 5 May 1995, 18.

¹³John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement. U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington), I.

¹⁴William J. Clinton, President of the United States, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, February 1995, 1.

¹⁵Lee, 18-20.

¹⁶William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Readiness at a Reasonable Cost". DEFENSE 95, Issue 2, American Forces Information Service, Alexandria, VA 22314, 6.

¹⁷Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division, "Warfighting Vision 2010 - A Framework for Change", (DRAFT) 1 August 1995, Ft Monroe, VA, 20.

¹⁸MG Donald E. Edwards and COL Bruce M. Lawlor, "Cost Effective And Ready to Fight," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1995, 59

¹⁹ Extracted from notes presented during the 1995 Adjutant General's Association Conference.

²⁰West, 8.

²¹Department of the Army, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, FM 100-17 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 28 October 1992), 1-6.

²²Katherine McIntire Peters, "To remain a player, the Guard may need a facelift," Army Times, 1 January 1996, 29.

²³Major General John R. D'Araujo, Jr. 1996 Posture Statement, Research and Staff Support Office, National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., 14.

²⁴William Matthews, "Remaining 'relevant is premise to new Guard role," Army Times, 19 February 1996, 14.

²⁵I commanded the 1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery, West Virginia Army National Guard, during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This battalion deployed to Saudi Arabia in 53 days from M-day and was ready several days before sea lift was available. Two ARNG Field Artillery Brigades deployed to DESERT STORM.

²⁶West, 7.

²⁷Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., CERTAIN VICTORY, United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington: USGPO, 1993), 380.

²⁸This concept was tested with 194th SAB under the Army Affiliation Program. The framework was developed to Battery and Section level. At first, this relationship was very stressful and demanding for both sides. Key leaders from the 194th SAB remained responsible for their own unit training programs. We soon learned that teamwork was the only solution to making both units successful. Our training programs eventually merged into one highly successful routine.

²⁹Perry, Readiness at a Reasonable Cost, 6.

³⁰Sean D. Naylor, "The 2d ACR's future is in doubt--again," Army Times, 2 October 1995, page 2 .

³¹Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.

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